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The Federal Acquisition Regulations prescribe certain
analytical tools and procedures to be used and followed by
the Government contracting officer in his determination of a
fair and reasonable price that the Government should pay for
required goods and services. This determination is made
during the contract evaluation and source selection phase of
the acquisition process.
However, during recent years additional tools and
methods have been prescribed for use. One must ask, in
light of recent trends to prescribe new analytical tools and
methods, whether our basic tools are adequate for the task,
or has the procurement environment become sufficiently
complex to warrant the use of additional tools and methods.
This thesis examines this question through an analysis
of current tools and methods used during contract evaluation
and source selection. It also offers an alternative
approach to contract evaluation and source selection based
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of procurement is to secure needed supplies
and services from responsible sources at fair and
reasonable prices calculated to result in the lowest
ultimate overall cost to the government. [Ref. l:p. 2-1]
This seemingly simple and rational definition from the
Federal Acquisition Regulations is the focus of this thesis,










Although all are equally important, this study will
concentrate upon the third stage of the process, as it
relates to the procurement of Department of Defense (DOD)
weapon systems during the last stage of the acquisition
cycle, production and deployment. For it is during the
contract evaluation and source selection stage that the
contracting officer must use prescribed analytical tools to
determine what is a fair and reasonable price calculated to
result in the lowest ultimate overall cost to the
Government.
Broadly speaking, there are two different methods of
contract proposal evaluation; price analysis and cost
analysis. There are several different source selection
methods that the Federal Government uses. Among these are
the two step, three step, and four step methods. While the
foundations that these various methods are based upon appear
to be firm, one must wonder why additional analytical tools
are periodically advocated. In recent years we have seen
should cost analysis prescribed by the Fiscal Year 1986
Department Of Defense Authorization Act for all major
defense systems acguisitions. Cost realism is another
concept that has become more prominent in the procurement
literature and Department Of Defense [DOD] regulations [Ref.
l:p. 3-53].
One must ask, in light of these trends to prescribe new
analytical methods, whether our basic analytical tools are
adequate for the task. Or has the procurement environment
become sufficiently complex to warrant the use of other
methods, such as should cost and cost realism?
This thesis will explore these questions through an
evaluation of current analytical tools and methods.
Additionally, if it is found that these tools are lacking,
thus warranting the use of other tools or methods, this
thesis will suggest alternatives that may strengthen our
ability to analyze and select contract sources.
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary question to be addressed in this thesis
is: What are the methods used, with regard to cost, to
analyze contract proposals and conduct source selection, and
how effective are they?
The subsidiary questions are:
1. What is should cost analysis, and what is its role
in contract proposal evaluation?




How can the contract evaluation and source
selection process be improved to insure the Government
receives a fair and reasonable price calculated to
result in the lowest ultimate overall cost to the
Government?
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to examine and answer
the research questions. Moreover, the interest here is also
to spark further research into the foundations upon which
current methods of contract evaluation and source selection
are based. It is apparent through the development of
should cost analysis and cost realism, that our current
methods of analysis may be insufficient. If this is in fact
the case, then it is time to re-evaluate the assumptions
that our methods are based upon.
C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
Price analysis, one of the two different analytical
techniques used to evaluate contract proposals, refers to
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the analysis of the price of the proposal without regard to
its component elements of cost. Price analysis is used on
all procurements regardless of the type of procurement
(sealed bid or competitive proposal)
.
Cost analysis, the second method used to evaluate
contract proposals, involves the analysis of the individual
cost elements that comprise the price. Cost analysis is
used when competition has been ineffective, or suspected of
being ineffective. Cost analysis naturally can only be used
for a competitive proposal procurement.
Should cost analysis is a cost analysis technique, but
hardly a typical technique that is regularly used. Rather
it is an exceptional technique that is prescribed for use in
procurements whose dollar value is very large, and there is
suspicion of less than efficient contractor production.
This thesis will broadly examine the regulatory
requirements for price and cost analysis, as well as the use
of should cost analysis. Additionally, it will examine the
circumstances that warrant the use of such an exceptional
technique as should cost.
Furthermore, the thesis will broadly examine the source
selection process and the way in which the results of the
contract evaluation process are used to make the source
selection decision. In this regard cost realism will be
discussed. Cost realism is an evaluation criterion in the
12
source selection process, but it, like should cost analysis,
is not typically used in most procurements.
After examining the regulatory requirements, this thesis
will then attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of contract
evaluation and source selection methods. In this regard,
weaknesses in these methods will be identified. Finally, an
alternative method, that can be used to compensate for the
identified weaknesses, will be offered.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis will start by first reviewing the
requirements for contract proposal evaluation in the FAR.
It will then examine the economic principles that support
the two methods required; price and cost analysis. The
thesis will then address the place of should cost analysis
in contract proposal evaluation. This analysis will explore
the history of should cost analysis and the current
requirement for should cost studies.
Part III of this thesis will look at the source
selection process. This analysis will draw upon the
requirements of the FAR, as well as the Department of
Defense Acquisition Regulations [DEAR], the Navy Acquisition
Regulations Supplement [NARSUP] , and DOD and Navy
Regulations. It will then look at cost realism and its role
in current source selection methods.
Part IV of this thesis will draw some conclusions about
the effectiveness of the aforementioned procedures and
13
methods. It will also indicate where, and why improvements
are warranted.
Part V will offer what is deemed to be a more
satisfactory means of evaluating contract proposals and
selecting contract sources. This analysis is based upon a
marginal analysis of proposed direct costs. By analyzing a
contractor's proposed marginal costs of production, the
relative efficiency of competing offerors could be
determined. This factor could in turn be used in special
circumstances as a source selection criterion.
Finally, this thesis will recommend circumstances during
which marginal analysis of contractor proposed production
costs could be used.
14
II. CONTRACT PROPOSAL EVALUATION
A. PRICE ANALYSIS
Price analysis, in its broadest sense, is: "The
examination of a seller's price without examination and
evaluation of the separate elements of the cost and profit
making up the price." [Ref. 2:p. 161]
In addition to being relatively inexpensive and easy to
conduct, price analysis is always conducted the same way.
It always involves the comparison of the bottom line price
with another price. In the competitive arena, either sealed
bid or competitive proposal, the bottom line of each bid or
offer is compared with one another. Various other
comparisons may also be made depending upon the dollar value
of the procurement involved. Among these other comparisons
are: [Ref. 3:pp. 15-35]
1. Comparison of prior proposed prices and contract
prices with current proposed prices for the same or
similar items.
2. Application of rough yardsticks (such as dollars per
pound or per horsepower, or other units) to highlight
significant inconsistencies that warrant additional
pricing inquiry.
3. Comparison with competitive published price lists,
published market prices of commodities, similar
indexes, and discount or rebate arrangements.
4
.
Comparison of proposed prices with independent
Government cost estimates.
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If the procurement is noncompetitive, extra care must be
taken because comparison of proposed prices received in
response to the solicitation cannot be done. More attention
must be paid to the other means of price comparison.
As stated in the FAR, price analysis is conducted on all
procurements to ensure that the overall price is fair and
reasonable. [Ref. 3 :p. 15-35] This begs the question, "What
then do we mean by a fair and reasonable price?" The answer
to this question can be found in the Armed Services Pricing
Manual [ASPM]
.
A fair and reasonable price is . . . one that is fair to
both parties, considering the promised quality and
timeliness of contract performance. Thus, to be fair to
both parties, the price must represent a reasonable
compromise between the seller's and the buyer's view of a
fair price. [Ref. l:p. 2-6]
The ASPM goes on to state that a fair and reasonable
price should be considered in three dimensions: fair under
current market conditions; reasonable to the seller; and
reasonable to the buyer.
Let us now consider the economic foundations of the
three dimensions within which a fair and reasonable price is
determined: the market, the buyer, and the seller.
Markets can be theoretically described in degrees of
competition. They can range from perfectly competitive to
imperfect. A perfectly competitive market is characterized
by four conditions. First the product of any one seller is
the same as the product of any other seller. That is, the
16
items are homogeneous and perfectly interchangeable.
Secondly, each buyer or seller in the market, is so small in
relation to the entire market, that he or she cannot affect
the product's price. Buyers and sellers are thus price
takers. Third, buyers and sellers, and their resources, are
free to enter and leave the market at will. Lastly, buyers
and sellers have perfect knowledge of market prices, and
relevant economic and technological data [Ref. 4:pp. 232-
233] .
In this perfectly competitive market, the market price
and quantity will be determined by the aggregate forces of
supply and demand. In the short run (a condition in which
capital assets are fixed) , these constantly changing forces
will repetitively define and redefine the market price and
quantity. As the market price and quantity is constantly
changing, an equilibrium price is never reached. Rather the
market tends toward an equilibrium price, but never reaches
it.
This cycle within which the competitive market tends
towards equilibrium price is illustrated in Figure 1. If
the market demand is represented by line Dl and the market
supply by line SI, then market price will be OPl at quantity
OQl. If another supplier enters the market with a supply
function represented by line S2, then the new price will be
reestablished at price 0P2 and quantity 0Q2 . Price and
quantity produced are thus established by the aggregate
17
Figure 1. Equilibrium Price
functions of market supply and demand. Those producers who
cannot produce at the market price are forced to leave the
market. As the aggregate quantity available on the market
becomes smaller, buyers will then be willing to pay more for
the smaller quantity that is now available. A new market
price is again reestablished at a higher price and lower
quantity. This cycle repeats itself continuously, as the
market seeks equilibrium price and quantity.
In a perfectly competitive market, a fair price is
therefore determined by the market forces of supply and
demand. However a word of caution is necessary. There are
no perfectly competitive markets in our world. There are
instead forces that act to interrupt the carefully
18
orchestrated forces of supply and demand from determining an
equilibrium price. There are Government regulatory agencies
that determine what the market price will be (e.g. Public
Utility Commissions) . There are taxes imposed on various
goods and services in support of socioeconomic and political
goals that distort the market price. There are laws that
restrict the behavior of individuals and firms in the market
(e.g., banking laws).
Although there are many forces that intervene in our
markets to render them less than perfectly competitive,
there are conditions under which we can assume that the
forces of supply and demand are present in sufficient
strength to be effective. This condition is referred to as
effective competition. The ASPM lists the following as
conditions necessary for effective competition. [Ref. l:p.
2-5]
The ASPM lists the following as conditions necessary for
effective competition. [Ref. l:p. 2-5]
1. At least two offers,
2. That can satisfy the government requirement,
3
.
Independently contend for a contract to be awarded to
the offeror that submits the lowest evaluated price,
4. By submitting priced offers responsive to the stated
requirements of the solicitation.
If the contracting officer can assure himself that
competition has been effective, by meeting the above
conditions, he can assume that the forces of supply and
19
demand will determine a price that is fair to both buyer
and seller. He can also assume that the price will be
reasonable to the seller, as those sellers who cannot
successfully compete will be free to leave the market. The
lowest price offered, by a responsive and responsible
offeror, will of course also be reasonable to the buyer.
Therefore, when competition is effective, price analysis
alone is sufficient to determine a fair and reasonable
price. However, let us now address the situation when
competition is not effective. In this situation, a case in
which the Government contracting officer will find himself
more often than not, there are conditions that prevent the
market from determining a fair and reasonable price.
The market may consist of only one supplier, a
monopolist. In this situation, the monopolist sets prices,
rather than taking the market prices. This price will
undoubtedly be higher than the price the effectively
competitive market would ask. Or the market may consist of
a small number of suppliers in a market effectively closed
to the entry of other competitors. In this situation, the
oligopoly, the relatively few, and protected from price
competition, set the market price by non-price competition
(e.g. advertising, quality) or even by collusion. By
choosing to not compete on the basis of price, the
oligopolist's price will again be higher than the price the
competitive market would ask.
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On the buyer side of the market, there may be equally
powerful forces restricting competition. The buyer may find
himself as the only user of a commodity. It is in such a
situation, a monopsony, that the Government often finds
itself in the procurement of weapon systems.
In a market in which competition is not effective, price
analysis alone will not be sufficient to determine a fair
and reasonable price. The contracting officer must look
beyond the prices offered, to the costs of production.
B. COST ANALYSIS
The FAR requires that contractors submit cost or pricing
data for the following contracts. [Ref. 3: pp. 15-27]
1. Negotiated contracts (except for unpriced actions such
as letter contracts) expected to exceed $100,000.
2. The modification of any sealed bid or negotiated
contract when the modification involves a price
adjustment expected to exceed $100,000.
3. The award of a subcontract at any tier, if the
contractor and each higher tier subcontractor have
been required to furnish certified cost or pricing
data, when the subcontract is expected to exceed
$100,000.
4. The modification of any subcontract covered by part 3
above, when the price adjustment is expected to exceed
$100,000.
The exceptions to this requirement for submittal of cost
or pricing data are when the contracting officer determines
that prices are: [Ref. 3:pp. 15-27]
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1. Based on adequate price competition, or
2. Based on established catalog or market prices of
commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the
general public, or
3. Set by law or regulation.
The FAR goes on to define cost analysis as: [Ref. 3: pp.
15-25]
The review and evaluation of the separate cost elements
and proposed profit of (a) an offeror's or contractor's
cost or pricing data, and (b) the judgmental factors
applied in projecting from the data to the estimated
costs, in order to form an opinion on the degree to
which the proposed costs represent what the contract
should cost, assuming reasonable economy and
efficiency.
Cost analysis is therefore a technique to be used to
evaluate a seller's actual or proposed cost data. The
purpose of analyzing cost data is to prepare a negotiating
position which the buyer can use to reach agreement with a
contractor.
If the contracting officer can assure himself that there
has been effective competition, in either a sealed bid or
competitive proposal, then he may satisfy himself through
the use of price analysis that the lowest price offered will
represent a fair and reasonable price. However, if there
has not been effective competition in a negotiated contract,
modification, or subcontract (of which each higher tier was
required to submit cost or pricing data) in excess of
$100,000, then cost analysis, in addition to price analysis
must be used to determine what is a fair and reasonable
price. Exceptions to this are noted above.
22
How then is cost analysis to be conducted? The FAR
prescribes the following techniques and procedures.
[Ref. 3:pp. 15-35 to 15-36]
1. Verification of cost or pricing data and evaluation of
cost elements, including
—
a. The necessity for and reasonableness of proposed
costs, including allowances for contingencies.
b. Projection of the offeror's cost trends, on the
basis of current and historical cost or pricing
data.
c. A technical appraisal of the estimated labor,
material, tooling, and facilities requirements and
of the reasonableness of scrap and spoilage
factors ; and
d. The application of audited or negotiated indirect
cost rates, labor rates, and cost of money or
other factors.
2. Evaluating the effect of the offeror's current
practices on future costs. In conducting this
evaluation, the contracting officer shall ensure that
the effects of inefficient or uneconomical past
practices are not projected into the future. In
pricing production of recently developed, complex
equipment, the contracting officer should make a trend
analysis of basic labor and material even in periods
of relative price stability.
3
.
Comparison of costs proposed by the offeror for
individual cost elements with
—
a. Actual costs previously incurred by the same
offeror;
b. Previous cost estimates from the offeror or from
other offerors for the same or similar items;
c. Other cost estimates received in response to the
Government's request;
d. Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCE) by
technical personnel; and
e. Forecasts or planned expenditures.
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4. Verification that the offeror's cost submissions are
in accordance with the contract cost principles and
procedures in FAR part 31 and, when applicable, the
requirements and procedures in FAR part 30, Cost
Accounting Standards (CAS)
.
5. Review to determine whether any cost or pricing data
necessary to make the contractor's proposal accurate,
complete, and current have not been submitted or
identified in writing by the contractor. If there are
such data, the contracting officer should attempt to
obtain them and negotiate, using them or making
satisfactory allowance for the incomplete data.
6. Analysis of the results of any make-or-buy program
reviews, in evaluating subcontract costs.
A significant difference between cost analysis and price
analysis is the absence of the market forces of supply and
demand in sufficient strength, that are used during
price analysis, to determine a fair and reasonable price.
Cost analysis, in effect, substitutes the subjective
interpretation of the contracting officer, or his
assistants, in determining the reasonableness and fairness
of contractor proposed costs. Without effective
competition, the contracting officer must assess the
proposed costs and answer the question, "Are these the costs
to produce the required goods and services, if the
contractor works with reasonable economy and efficiency."
In answering this question, the contracting officer must
center his evaluation around the contractor's cost
estimating and accounting system. Both must conform to the
requirements of the Cost Accounting Standards [CAS] and the
Cost Principles of the FAR. From this point the contracting
officer must then proceed to the assumptions the contractor
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has made in preparing his estimate. The contracting officer
can question the validity of these assumptions based upon
comparisons made with costs received from other offerors, or
with costs of similar items. Comparison may also be made
with cost estimates. Finally the contracting officer will
examine the proposed costs from a technical perspective.
This examination should determine the effectiveness and
efficiency of the means of production, as well as the
necessity for costs based upon the means of production.
In conducting the cost analysis, the contracting officer
is forced to make subjective decisions. There is no
universally accepted quantitative method, as in price
analysis, to indicate with a reasonable amount of certainty
what is a fair and reasonable price. The conditions of
effective competition are not present, and therefore the
lowest price cannot be assumed to be the most reasonable.
In fact, there will certainly be occasions when the lowest
price is not reasonable. VThen there is effective
competition, we assume that contractors are free to move
into and out of a market, or to at least have the freedom to
choose not to compete. However, when contractors do not
have this freedom of movement or choice, they may be forced
to propose a price below the actual costs of production in
order to maintain market share.
The difficulties inherent in the subjective nature of
cost analysis have laid the foundations for additional
25
analysis that will better indicate when a contractor is not
producing with reasonable efficiency. One such analysis is
should cost.
C. SHOULD COST ANALYSIS
Although should cost analysis actually had it's origin
in the private sector, it was adopted by the Department of
Defense as a panacea to cure what was felt to be
unreasonably high cost proposals. [Ref. 5:pp. 26-28] Its
first application was by Mr. Gordon Rule, who, as Director
of the Procurement Control Clearance Division at the Naval
Material Command, created a special negotiating team to
review production of 2,053 TF 30 engines for the F-111
aircraft by Pratt and Whitney (P&W) in late 1967.
The goal of this special team was ultimately expanded to
obtain a binding agreement with P&W to make certain changes
in their practices and procedures, and to obtain certain
improvements and innovations that would bring about
economies and efficiencies for future requirements. This
special negotiation team remained in the P&W plant for three
months and utilized approximately 50 people to conduct the
review. The team was comprised of personnel from the Navy,
Air Force, Navy Plant Representative Office (NAVPRO) , Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) , and P&W. Each member was
highly skilled in one or more areas of management and/or
production control. Areas of the P&W operation that were
targeted for review included: [Ref. 5: pp. 27-28]
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Labor Standards Manufacturing and General Overhead
Allowances Standard Material
Plant Capacity Material Variations
Machine Utilization Vendor Tooling
Labor Cost Make or Buy
Variations Purchasing
The result of this intensive effort, which took eleven
months to complete, was a negotiated contract with P&W that
saved an estimated $100 million. It should be noted that
P&W was at the time a sole source for this contract.
Because of the interdependencies of this relationship, P&W
was probably as eager as DOD to reach an agreement.
From this auspicious beginning, the prominence of should
cost analysis as a technique to be used in determining what
a contractor's production costs should be, if he performs
with reasonable economy and efficiency, has grown. In
particular, the publicized procurement abuses associated
with the Reagan Administration's defense buildup of the
early 1980 's resulted in Congressional action mandating the
use of should cost analysis.
Several amendments to the 1986 DOD Authorization Act,
included in Title IX Procurement Policy Reform and other
Procurement matters, directed the Secretary of Defense to
incorporate should cost analysis into DOD procurements.
Specifically, the Congress directed the Secretary to report
the programs marked for should cost analysis to Congress,
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submit a list of those programs planned for should cost
analysis, and submit a list of those major acquisitions that
are not planned for should cost analysis with justification
why those acquisitions are not planned to receive should
cost analysis. [Ref. 5:p. 17]
Should cost analysis has effectively been forced upon
DOD as a technique to be used on all major DOD contractors.
It is an extensive effort, in terms of both time and
personnel, to actually go inside a contractor's plant and
identify inefficiencies to the contractor. The return on
this substantial investment is the reduced costs that can be
used to negotiate a lower contract price.
Cost savings of 7% to 15% have been reported with use of
should cost analysis [Ref. 5:pp. 28-29]. However, because
of its high investment in time and personnel , the FAR
restricts the use of should cost analysis to acquisitions
where; [Ref. 3: pp. 15-39]
1. Some initial production has already taken place.
2. The contract will be awarded on a sole source basis.
3
.
There are future year production requirements for
substantial quantities of like items.
4. The items being acquired have a history of increasing
costs.
5. The work is sufficiently defined to permit an
effective analysis and major changes are unlikely.
6. Sufficient time is available to plan and conduct the
should cost analysis adequately.
28
7. Personnel with the required skills are available or
can be assigned for the duration of the should cost
analysis.
Should cost analysis is an attempt to compensate for the
weakness inherent in the subjective nature of traditional
cost analysis. Because traditional cost analysis methods do
not guarantee, with a comfortable degree of confidence, a
fair and reasonable price, additional methods are warranted.
However, even with a more rigorous method, such as should
cost, there are substantial restrictions placed upon its
use, as noted above.
D. SUMMARY
Thus far, this research has examined the regulatory
requirements for price and cost analysis. Upon further
examination, it was shown that there is a firm economic
basis supporting price analysis. Namely, in the presence of
effective competition, the market forces will act to ensure
that the most efficient producer may submit the lowest bid,
or offer, if he is so inclined. The lowest bid or offer
will therefore represent the fairest and most reasonable
price to both buyer and seller.
Cost analysis, on the other hand, is subject to much
more subjective interpretation and conclusions. Because
competition is not effective, or suspected of not being
effective, the market forces of supply and demand cannot be
relied upon by the contracting officer to determine a fair
and reasonable price. The contracting officer must subject
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the contractor's estimates, and estimating and accounting
systems to his review. He must determine if the
contractor's proposal reflects the efforts of someone
working with reasonable efficiency and economy.
Lastly, we examined should cost analysis. Should cost
analysis is a cost analysis technique that has been
developed in more recent years. It is a technique that is
to be used in restricted circumstances where the Government
suspects that substantial cost savings could be gained
through improvements in contractor efficiency and economy.
The Government investment in the should cost analysis
itself, however, is substantial. Candidates for should cost
analysis must therefore be carefully chosen, as the danger
exists of the costs of the study being more expensive than
the potential benefits. The regulatory restrictions on the
use of should cost analysis reflect this conservatism.
Cost analysis is an inherently weak technique as it
depends upon the subjective interpretation of those doing
the analysis. As long as this inherent weakness remains,
more rigorous analysis, such as that provided by should
cost, will be required. However should cost is not the
panacea that its proponents claim it to be.
Cost analysis, as a method of contract proposal
evaluation, could stand to be strengthened. However, in
order to understand more fully those areas where improvement
can be made, the relationship of cost analysis to cost
30




A. COST ESTIMATING VS COST ANALYSIS
This chapter, will turn attention to the source
selection process. It is during the source selection
process that the results of price and cost analysis are used
to help determine a contract award that will represent the
greatest value to the Government. First, before proceeding,
the distinction between cost estimating and cost analysis
must be made clear.
Cost estimating is a process done by both the buyer and
the seller. The seller must do cost estimating for the
obvious reason that it is required in order to submit an
offer to the Government. PL-87-653, The Truth in
Negotiations Act requires full disclosure of cost or
pricing data for all contracts in excess of $100,000
(exceptions to this requirement were noted in Chapter II)
.
This includes full disclosure of the estimating methods used
by the offeror in compiling his proposal. [Ref. 7:p. 265]
But, depending upon the dollar value of the procurement,
the Government will also prepare its own cost estimate of
the procurement. For those procurements designated as major
weapon systems, and those to be managed as major weapon




In addition to the need to prepare an estimate for
budgetary reasons, the Government will also prepare an
estimate to be used as a yardstick in analyzing contract
proposals. As previously discussed, when effective
competition is present, price analysis alone is sufficient
to determine a fair and reasonable price. However, in the
absence of effective competition, cost analysis of the
individual cost elements of each proposal must be
undertaken. In both cases the IGCE can be used to evaluate
the bottom line and individual cost elements. (It is of
particular importance if the proposal is from a sole source,
as the IGCE may provide the only means of comparison with a
proposal's price and cost elements)
Cost analysis, however, is a process done only by the
buyer. It is a process that proceeds from the time the
offeror's proposal is received by the Government. Nor can
it proceed until such time as the offeror's proposal is
received. Part of the cost analysis may include, however,
an IGCE. Thus, in this regard the Government's cost
estimating process may be considered a subset of cost
analysis.
Cost estimating and cost analysis are therefore two very
closely related processes. In a sense, they are mirror
images of each other. It should not be surprising to find
that a very good cost estimator will also make a very good
cost analyst.
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Cost analysis is, however, dependent upon the cost
estimate. Cost analysis cannot be done in a vacuum.
Although this at first may seem like a truism, the
significance of this point should not be overlooked.
Because cost analysis depends upon the cost estimate, this
in effect means that the contractor can indirectly influence
the thrust of the subsequent cost analysis.
To illustrate how this can be done, consider the case of
a DOD procurement of a weapon system during the production
and deployment phase of the weapon system acquisition cycle.
Potential offerors will possess superior knowledge of the
market composition and competitor's prices. If in fact the
competition is effective, then the respective pricing
strategies of offerors will be controlled in effect by the
marketplace forces of supply and demand. In order to have a
reasonable chance of winning the contract, a contractor can
not offer a price too far above his competitors. If he does,
he will effectively price himself out of the market. The
lowest responsive and responsible bidder could win the
competition.
On the other hand, more likely than not there will be
competition, but the competition will not be deemed
effective. This will occur if, either the proposed prices
are so close together that they cannot be differentiated, or
price directed sourcing is inappropriate (e.g. during an
educational buy to establish a second source) . In this case
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the pricing strategy will be much more flexible. An
offeror's price may now range as high as his estimating
system may deem necessary, and as low as his competitor's
proposed estimate.
In the first situation, where competition was effective,
the price offered was in effect constrained by the
competition. In the second case, where competition was not
effective, the price offered is considered not to be
necessarily indicative of the offeror's cost to produce.
Although price must be considered, it is subordinate to the
analysis of the reasonableness of the cost elements.
When competition is not effective, or price directed
sourcing is inappropriate, source selection must be made on
the basis of other factors, in addition to price. The
reasonableness of the costs proposed is one of these
factors. Cost analysis will, as indicated in Chapter 1,
strive to identify what a reasonable and fair price should
be through the examination of individual cost elements.
However, as long as the offeror can justify all, or as many
as possible of his estimated costs, it is unlikely that cost
analysis will result in anything more than a marginal
decrease in the offeror's original proposal. In fact, in
such a situation, it would not be unthinkable that the IGCE
would be re-evaluated upward to reflect the higher costs
submitted in the proposals. Because the Government has been
forced to subjectively evaluate the proposed costs, the
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contractor has much more discretion in deciding proposed
costs, and ultimately price. The offeror thus indirectly
controls the results of the Government cost analysis, to a
much greater extent than when the Government uses price
analysis to determine a fair and reasonable price.
To summarize, there are two alternative routes that a
contractor's proposal may take. If there is effective
competition present, the fairness and reasonableness of his
proposal will be determined through price analysis of the
proposals. Price analysis will depend upon the market
forces of supply and demand to indicate which proposal
represents a fair and reasonable price. In the absence of
effective competition, the contractor will have much more
flexibility in preparing his contract proposal. Because the
Government will be forced to determine the reasonableness of
the offered price through the use of cost analysis, the
contractor's proposed price will rest upon the strength of
his estimating system. He may therefore choose from among
several different pricing strategies. The contractor in
effect controls the thrust of the cost analysis.
With this in mind, let us now turn our attention to how
the Government, as a buyer, utilizes the information from
contract evaluation to make contract award during the source
selection process.
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B. THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS
If, as we saw in Chapter I, the objective of cost (and
price analysis) is to determine what is a fair and
reasonable price the Government should pay for required
goods and services, then the purpose of cost analysis is to
develop a negotiating position. As we shall see, DOD must
develop a negotiating position for each offeror that
qualifies to enter discussions. For it is during
negotiations that the buyer and seller will reach mutual
agreement on a price.
The easiest source selection method to understand is the
sealed bid. The sealed bid is one of two authorized
competitive contracting methods established by the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) . (The other
method being Competitive Proposals.) [Ref. 7:p. 126] In
order to use the sealed bid procedure, three requirements
must be met [Ref. 7:p. 126].
1. Award of the contract must be on the basis that all
bidders have an equal chance to receive the contract.
2. Selection of the winning bidder must be based upon the
lowest bid received (from a responsive and responsible




Selection of the winning contractor must be through a
public procedure in which a public record of the
decision is made available to any interested party.
If the contracting officer can then subsequently assure
himself that competition has been effective, price analysis
is the appropriate means of determining source selection.
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The lowest bidder will represent a fair and reasonable
price.
Source selection for the second method of competitive
contracting prescribed by CICA is somewhat more complicated.
Competitive proposals are first of all used when DOD
anticipates that discussions will be necessary between buyer
and seller. Discussions may be necessary, and sealed
bidding inappropriate for a variety of reasons. Among these
are.
1. The inability of DOD to describe the required goods or
services in sufficient detail such that every bidder
will have an equal chance of contract award.
2. When price alone is not the most important basis of
contract award.
3. When competition is deemed inadequate to support price
directed sourcing.
When these conditions exist, the FAR requires the
contracting officer to follow the three step source
selection procedure. The three step procedure is as follows
[Ref. 3:pp. 15-19 to 15-23].
1. Issuance of the Government's solicitation in a Request
For Proposals (RFP)
.
2. Receipt and evaluation of proposals in accordance with
previously defined and approved evaluation criteria.
3. Contract award.
Before expanding on these three steps, several points
deserve clarification. Firstly, the Government must always
reserve the right to make contract award without discussions
with any of the offerors. This caveat is warranted as
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competition may be deemed effective, thus permitting
contract award on the basis of price alone. However, once
discussions have been held with one offeror, they must be
held with all offerors.
Secondly, where competition is deemed not to be
effective, contract award will still be made on the basis of
at least price and other price related factors. The
Government may select in this case the source whose proposal
offers the greatest value to the Government in terms of
performance, cost, schedule, logistics support and other
factors. The choice of the proposal that represents the
greatest value, implies that the Government is capable of
making tradeoffs among these factors to yield the most
advantageous proposal. However, price or cost to the
Government shall be included as an evaluation factor in
every source selection.
In now turning to discuss the three step source
selection procedure in more detail, the first item to define
is the source selection criteria. The FAR lists the
following, in addition to price, as evaluation factors that
may apply to a particular acquisition: cost realism,
technical excellence, management capability, personnel
qualifications, experience, past performance, and schedule
[Ref. 3:pp. 15-19]. However, the RFP must indicate the
evaluation criteria that will be used and their relative
importance. In addition, the source selection plan, listing
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the source selection criteria and their relative importance,
must be completed prior to issuance of the RFP.
In discussing step two of the process, the Department of
the Navy Supplemental Regulations (NARSUP) to the FAR will
be used for examples. The NARSUP requires that, prior to
opening negotiations with any of the offerors, a summary
comparison of the appropriate cost elements will be prepared
[Ref. 8:p. 1.6-24]. Table I illustrates this comparison for
sample typical cost elements.
This summary comparison must be made for each offeror in
the competitive range. The determination of the competitive
range is made through a process in which offerors are sorted
into three categories.
1. Those offers which have a reasonable chance of being
awarded the contract.
2. Those offers potentially capable of being awarded the
contract, yet discussions are required to clarify and
discern uncertainties and ambiguities.
3. Those offers clearly not acceptable.
The key decision is whether the offeror, on the basis of
price or cost, has a reasonable chance of being awarded the
contract [Ref. 7:p. 266]. If so, then they will be
included in the competitive range and will be included in
all further discussions. In addition, those who fall into
the second category will be included in all subsequent
discussions until such time as they may be disqualified from
further discussions. Those in the third category must be
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TABLE I
SUMMARY COST ELEMENT COMPARISON
Contractor's DCAA Field Prenegotiation

















notified immediately that they are not eligible to receive
the award.
Through comparison of the contractor's proposal with the
Defense Contract Audit Agency's audit report, and with the
technical report included in the field pricing report, and
based upon cost analysis of the proposal's cost elements, a





The prenegotiating position is that which the negotiator
will carry into his negotiations with respective offerors.
The contracting officer negotiates a separate agreement with
each offeror.
The final step of the process, contract award, must be
made on the basis of the previously established evaluation
criteria. Several methods are used; however, the three most
prominent are: adjective ranking, numerical point scoring
system, and the composite method [Ref. 9:pp. 7-9].
Adjective scoring involves the application of adjective
labels, such as superior, good, average, etc., to each
evaluation factor, including cost, for each proposal. It
is important that the adjectives applied to each proposal
factor are kept confidential to prevent them from
influencing the choice of adjectives to be applied to the
other proposal factors. From this a summary overall rating
is assigned to each proposal. After the overall adjective
ratings are completed, proposals are ranked in comparison
with each other.
The numerical point scoring system is similar to the
adjective ranking system, except that numerical values,
typically from 0-100, are applied to all evaluation factors
instead of adjectives. Proposals are then similarly ranked
according to their numerical score.
Finally, the composite method, is, as its name implies,
a combination of adjective labels and numerical scores. The
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numerical scores are assigned as a preliminary assessment or
guide in selecting the most appropriate adjective ratings.
Adjective ratings are then applied based upon the numerical
scores received. Proposals are then ranked against each
other as in the adjective method. In all three methods
different weights may be assigned to each evaluation
criterion according to the importance placed upon that
criterion for the instant contract. The weights must be
decided, however, prior to scoring or rating of the
proposals.
DOD has developed a four step source selection
procedure, mainly used in research and development
contracts. [Ref. 10: p. 15.6-1] The primary difference
between this procedure and the three step procedure
previously discussed, is that cost and technical proposals
are received in a two phased process and after source
selection has been made, final negotiations are held between
the DOD and the contractor to determine the final contract
price. The evaluation procedures are essentially the same.
The significance of the source selection process, for
the purposes of this thesis, is that the process may not
necessarily, in fact, result in the choice of the best value
to the Government. The process assumes that proposals can
be scored, or rated in varying degrees of accuracy, on the
basis of predetermined evaluation criteria. This, itself,
assumes that all proposals will differentiate themselves
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according to these evaluation criteria. But what happens if
they do not differ substantially with respect to many of
the evaluation criteria?
The results can be seen in the following example.
Assume that two contractors are competing for a competitive
proposal type contract. Their proposals are evaluated and
found to be equally acceptable with the exception of cost.
In this situation, the bottom line price will become the
discriminating factor, as the contracting officer will
negotiate the lowest price possible with each competitor.
While this may at face value appear not to present any
problems, upon closer examination it may present significant
difficulties.
If, in fact, the offeror with the lowest price has
intentionally underbid the contract in hopes of winning the
contract, on the basis of price alone, then the Government
'^. can expect to see change proposals subsequent to contract
award. The contractor's strategy in this case may have been
to underbid his competition and then increase the contract
\"" price through the negotiation of change proposals. In the
long run this may increase the cost of the contract
substantially to the Government.
Has the award of the contract in this case been to the
proposal that represents the best value to the Government?
Clearly, the Government assumed that the source selection
process had resulted in award to the best value. However,
44
because price alone may not represent the best value, the
Government may be deceived in making award on the basis of
price alone. The source selection process thus may not
offer the Government the best value. Rather it may in some
circumstances encourage the contractor to underbid the
contract in order to win the competition. Further
refinement of the process is necessary.
C. COST REALISM
Cost realism is a contract evaluation criterion, which
in a manner similar to the way in which should cost analysis
has attempted to compensate for the inadequacies of cost
analysis, has been used to compensate for the above
identified weaknesses of the source selection process. The
requirement that contractor proposal costs reflect realistic
estimates of the actual work to be done can be found across
the Services.
In the Department of the Army, AMC Regulation 715-1
defines cost realism as,
The employment of preplanned methods to determine the
probable total cost for a procurement at completion; cost
realism involves a comprehensive analysis to develop and
establish the probable overall cost of performance when
related to the required technical scope of the work.
[Ref. 6:p. 3-2]
Department of the Air Force Regulation 70-15 states.
Continued effort must be exerted to achieve greater cost
realism in proposals for major development programs. A
proposal may be penalized. . .to the degree that the
proposed cost/price is unrealistically low. [Ref. 6:p.
3-2]
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within the Department of the Navy, cost realism has
taken on a quantitative aspect. At what was formally known
as the Naval Electronics Systems Command [NAVELEX] , and is
now known as the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
[SPAWAR] , Cost Realism is directly used as a source
selection criterion.
As one of several source selection criteria, SPAWAR will
give rather explicit guidance to offerors on the importance
placed upon the cost realism of the offer.
Cost will be evaluated to determine whether the estimate
is reasonable and realistic for the technical/management
approach offered, as well as to determine the offeror's
practical understanding of the effort. The government
will establish realistic contract cost for the offeror's
proposal based upon the offeror's design and offeror's
historical cost as demonstrated by the offeror. The cost
evaluation will assess the following elements: cost
realism and realistic estimated (absolute) cost.
Cost realism factors to be evaluated under cost
realism include:
1. To minimize built in cost growth, the government
intends to evaluate the realism of the offeror's proposed
costs in terms of the offeror's proposed approach.
Proposals may be penalized to the degree that the proposed
costs are unrealistic. To assist the government's
evaluation, offerors are required to furnish the
procedures and rationale used in compiling proposed costs.
All information such as IR&D effort, etc. , which an
offeror wants the government to consider under this factor
must be disclosed.
2. An offeror's proposal is presumed to represent the
best efforts to respond to the solicitation. Any
inconsistency, whether real or apparent, between promised
performance and cost should be explained in the proposal.
For example, if the intended use of new and innovative
production techniques is the basis for an abnormally low
estimate, the nature of these techniques and their impact
on cost should be explained; or if a corporate policy
decision has been made to absorb a portion of the
estimated cost, that should be stated in the proposal.
Any significant inconsistency, if unexplained, raises a
fundamental issue of the offeror's understanding of the
nature and scope of the work required and of the ability
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to perform the contract, and may be grounds for rejection
of the proposal. The burden of proof as to cost
credibility rests with the offeror.
3. A comparison will be made of each offeror's proposed
costs with the government developed realistic estimated
contract cost for that offeror, to evaluate the offeror's
understanding of the resources required to successfully
perform the proposed contract. The closer the offeror's
proposed cost is to the government developed realistic
contract cost, the higher the score.
The scoring system used by SPAWAR to determine cost




Figure 2. Cost Realism Scoring
The score received by an offer is based on how close the
offeror's proposed cost is to the Government's estimate.
The score is a maximum of 10 if the proposed cost is
sufficiently close to the Government estimate-typically 1.5%
to 3.0%. The score is a minimum of 1 if the proposed cost
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is sufficiently above or below the Government
estimate-typically 15% to 25%. In between, the score can be
interpreted from the "Mesa", as shown in Figure 2. [Ref.
6:pp. 4-5 to 4-6]
The score received during this cost realism evaluation
will then be used during the source selection process to
determine contract award.
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have examined the source selection
process. We have seen that the results of the contract
evaluation process are used directly in source selection in
determining a prenegotiating position. The prenegotiating
position must be developed for each proposal in the
competitive range.
The source selection process strives to identify that
proposal which will offer the greatest value to the
Government. This is accomplished through the use of source
selection criteria and negotiations.
The prerequisite methods that are used prior to entering
source selection are, however, less than perfect. Cost
analysis can be indirectly influenced by a contractor's
estimating methods and system. During the source selection
process itself, the lack of effective competition may result
in the selection of a contract winner on the basis of price




Cost realism is a source selection criterion used to
preclude either contractor underbidding or overbidding.
However, as we shall see in the next chapter, it also has
dangers to avoid in its application.
The next chapter will concentrate on drawing some
conclusions as to the effectiveness of the contract
evaluation and source selection process based upon our
examination of the process thus far.
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IV. FINDINGS
A. FAIR AND REASONABLE PRICE VERSUS BEST VALUE
The analysis thus far has shown that there are two
methods the Government may use, during the contract
evaluation stage of the acquisition process, to determine a
fair and reasonable price to pay for required goods and
services. These two methods are price analysis and cost
analysis.
Price analysis has a firm economic foundation to support
itself. It assures the contracting officer that when
effective competition is present, the most efficient
producer will be able to offer the lowest price, if he is so
inclined to do so. The forces of the marketplace thus
control the pricing strategy of the competitors to a very
great extent. Because of this, the Government, as the
buyer, may rest fairly well assured that in choosing the
lowest bid in the presence of effective competition, they
are receiving a price that is fair and reasonable to both
buyer and seller.
The other method considered is cost analysis. Cost
analysis is used in the absence of effective competition.
Cost analysis consists of various mechanisms that test the
reasonableness of the offeror's assumptions and estimating
system. Cost analysis strives to assess the validity of the
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contractor's proposal by substituting the contracting
officer's analysis for the forces of the marketplace.
However, cost analysis is, at best, an imperfect
analytical methodology. Assuming that we are analyzing the
cost proposals of two or more offerors competing for a DOD
production contract, the contracting officer must begin his
cost analysis with the system or methods the contractor uses
to compile his proposals. The buyer in this situation can
be "gamed" by the seller. The seller can rely upon his cost
estimating system to inflate costs, if he is so motivated,
up to, but probably just below the amount the Government has
budgeted for the program. The onus is therefore upon the
Government contracting officer to detect and uncover this
"padding"
.
This "padding" can result in either of two different
cases. In the first case, that of a cost type contract, the
offeror that wins the contract could invest this "padding"
in the costs incurred during contract performance. As he is
reimbursed for all allocable and allowable costs, this
"padding" results in larger revenues under the instant
contract, but also more, or better, contract performance to
the Government.
In the second case, that of a fixed price type contract,
this "padding" could instead result in greater profits for
the contract winner. Under a fixed price type contract, the
contract price is fixed for the duration of contract
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performance. Thus by overestimating costs, and keeping
actual incurred costs low, the contractor ensures himself a
greater profit.
The competitive proposal contracting arena can be viewed
a negative, but perhaps realistic, game of cat and mouse.
In this game, the Government contracting officer tries to
catch the seller padding his estimates. As one can readily
see, success at this game will greatly depend upon the
experience and skills of the players.
When the Government can therefore use price analysis,
the pricing strategies of offerors are fairly well
constrained. However, when the Government is forced to rely
upon cost analysis, the offerors control their pricing
strategies to a much greater extent.
Should cost analysis is one method that is used to
compensate for the deficiencies of cost analysis. Should
cost analysis has reportedly resulted in cost savings of
anywhere from 7% to 15% [Ref. 5:pp. 28-29]. On the one
hand, this validates the argument that traditional cost
analysis methods do not necessarily result in fair and
reasonable prices. However, it does not mean that should
cost analysis has resulted in cost reductions resulting in
the lowest possible prices. These indicated cost reductions
may be only a portion of the iceberg .
Should cost analysis is a valuable, but expensive tool.
Should cost analysis requires the utilization of many highly
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skilled specialists for extended periods of time. Past
should cost manpower requirements ranged from as few as
eight persons to as many as 80 persons. Depending on the
depth of the analysis, Government personnel may be at a
contractor's facility from a few weeks to several months
[Ref. 5: p. 23].
Because of the significant costs incurred by the
Government, should cost projects must be carefully chosen.
The real possibility exists of the costs outweighing the
benefits.
We have also examined the source selection process and
the procedures that are used to ascertain the greatest value
to the Government. We have seen how this process can lead
to underbidding of contracts or "buy ins". Cost realism was
subsequently presented as a concept that is used to
compensate for the deficiencies of the source selection
process.
The source selection process seeks to evaluate contract
proposals on a "greatest value" or "best buy" basis [Ref.
8:p. 2]. The process requires the contracting officer to
develop a prenegotiating position for each proposal, based
upon the results of the previously completed cost analysis,
the DCAA Audit Report, and the field pricing report. A
negotiated price is then reached with each offeror from
which the Government may select the "greatest value" . The
"greatest value" in this case is that offer which provides
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the solicited product or service in the most beneficial
combination of performance, schedule, and logistic support,
at the lowest overall price to the Government.
However, this process also encourages the contractor to
"game" the Government. If, as often happens, competitive
proposals are evaluated such that they are scored relatively-
equal on all evaluation criteria, except cost, then price
will become the discriminating factor. The lowest price may
not, however, in this case represent the greatest value. If
an offeror is intentionally underbidding a contract in
anticipation of submitting change proposals after contract
award, then the ultimate overall cost to the Government
could be much greater than that initially accepted by the
Government. Contractors may be forced to attempt "buy ins"
of this nature in order to maintain their market share in a
shrinking market.
To preclude "buy ins," cost realism scoring systems are
used to evaluate the basis of proposed costs. There are
pitfalls, however, to avoid in applying cost realism scoring
systems. The system used by the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command [SPAWAR] , relies upon an independent
Government cost estimate. However, this estimate, (like the
contractor's proposed estimate) is a random variable. Both
estimates, in order to be compared, must be identified by
their distributions. The following example illustrates this
case [Ref . ll:p. 2]
.
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Consider two competing proposals which differ
substantially with respect to the technical and management
approach. Proposals costs, the corresponding Government
estimates for those proposals and the uncertainty associated
with the cost estimates, represented by their probability
distributions, are graphically shown in Figure 3.
- Proposal A: This system uses existing technology in
which the offeror is the industry leader. Costs are
easily related to historical performance. Ca represents
a point on the x axis associated with contractor A's
cost proposal, and Cg(A) represents a point on the x
axis associated with the Government estimate for that
proposal.
- Proposal B: This system requires the development of new
technology about which there is little historical cost
data. CER'S involve large extrapolations. Cb
represents a point on the x axis associated with
contractor B's cost proposal, and Cg(B) represents a
point on the x axis associated with the Government
estimate for that proposal.
In both cases the Government estimate for respective
proposals, Cg(A) and Cg(B) , exceeds the proposal cost by
the same amount.
Under the cost realism scoring system both proposals
would receive the same score, as they differ from the
Government cost estimate by the same amount. However, the
probability that contractor A's cost proposal represents the
true cost to produce, as estimated by the Government, is
less than .01. Contractor B's proposal, on the other hand,
is much more realistic, falling well within the left hand
tail of the probability distribution.
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Figure 3. Cost Realism Scoring System
This illustration demonstrates the difficulties
associated with the use of scoring systems to determine the
realism of contract proposal costs.
Present cost analysis methods, as described by the FAR,
do not necessarily result in the choice of a fair and
reasonable price. Rather, they permit a offeror the
flexibility to liberally estimate costs, if he so desires.
Nor does the source selection process necessarily result in
contract award for to the "greatest value". The source
selection process may, rather, encourage the contractor to
attempt a "buy in." Both processes react to contractor
estimating and pricing strategies and facilitate "gaming."
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B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Price analysis methods are based upon the underlying
forces of the marketplace to determine a fair and
reasonable price.
2. Cost analysis is a subjective method lacking a firm
economic basis, such as that which supports price
analysis.
3. Cost analysis does not necessarily result in the
choice of a fair and reasonable price that the
Government should pay for required goods and services,
and may actually encourage the contractor to liberally
estimate costs, if he so desires.
4. Should cost analysis is a concept that is used to
compensate for the weaknesses of cost analysis.
5. There are benefits that can be derived from should
cost analysis, but its costs can also be very
substantial.
6. The source selection process may often result in price
alone determining contract award. Price alone may
not, however, represent the greatest value to the
Government
.
7. The source selection process contributes to contractor
"gaming," through "buy ins."
8. A new approach to cost analysis is required that will




A new approach to the source selection process is
required that will strengthen the Government's ability
to choose contract sources representing the greatest
value to the Government.
The analysis thus far indicates that our present
contract evaluation and source selection tools work fairly
well, most of the time. However there are circumstances
under which they are subject to failure, resulting in
possible financial injury to the Government. The next
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A. UTILITY AND VALUE
A logical starting place in strengthening the contract
evaluation and source selection process is with the concept
of value. The desired result of the process is to determine
the greatest value to the Government. However, this is also
the source of the process's weakness. The source selection
process assumes that tradeoffs can be made between
performance, cost, schedule, and logistics support to yield
the selection of that proposal that will offer the
Government the most advantageous combination at the least
cost. However, the scoring systems used in the source
selection process do not necessarily assure the choice of
the above defined greatest value. Rather, they may force
the choice of something less than greatest value. This will
occur when all the source selection criteria, except cost,
are evaluated so close as to be indistinguishable. Price
then becomes the discriminating factor. When a "buyin" is
in process, this can result in financial harm to the
Government.
In the following analysis, an alternative approach to
value is presented based upon a marginal analysis of the
direct costs of production. Marginal analysis is central
to economics. Economic analysis in general is concerned
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with the way in which resources are allocated among
alternative uses to satisfy competing demands.
Microeconomics concerns itself with the behavior of
consumers and firms in pursuit of optimal resource
allocation. [Ref. 4:p. 1]
In order to determine how to optimize resource
allocation, one must first determine the worth, or value of
resources. For many years classical economists had
considered the value of a resource to be determined by the
cost of its production. During the 1870 's this concept
underwent radical change. Several European economists,
simultaneously and independently, proposed the idea that
value was a relative concept. Representative of this notion
were the theories of William Jevons in England, Leon Walras
in Switzerland, and Carl Menger in Austria. [Ref. 12 :p.
204]
This marginalist concept, as it became known, proposed
that value derives from utility and scarcity rather than
from the costs of production [Ref. 12:p. 222]. The utility
derived from a resource is relative to its availability.
The larger the supply of a given resource, the less a
consumer will be willing to pay for one additional unit of
this resource. Thus, the utility of a resource to a user
will vary from consumer to consumer depending upon the
availability of the resource.
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If it was possible to measure the satisfaction a
consumer derives from a particular resource, one could
measure the total utility associated with certain resources.
For example, the utility attached to food could be expressed
in units.
Marginal utility, on the other hand, measures the
additional satisfaction derived from an additional unit of a
resource (when the levels of consumption of all other
commodities are held constant) . The marginal utility in our
food example is derived by taking the difference in total
utility as additional pounds of food are added. Table 2
shows this relationship. [Ref. 4:pp. 51-52]
TABLE 2
TOTAL AND MARGINAL UTILITY
Marginal Utility
The rational consumer will try to maximize utility.
This is a simple concept that means consumers try to derive
as much satisfaction as possible from available resources.
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However, as we all know, resources have a cost, and most, if
not all consumers have limited funds. So consumers must
maximize utility within the constraints of their budget.
Consumers will therefore attempt to purchase that
combination of resources that will yield the greatest total
utility.
In order to maximize utility, subject to the constraints
of budgets and market prices, the consumer must allocate his
funds such that the marginal utility of the last cent spent
on good A is equal to the marginal utility of the last cent
spent on good B. This requires that differences in
expenditures must be balanced by differences in utility, so
that if the expenditure on good A is twice as high as on
good B, the marginal utility associated with good A will be
twice as high as that associated with good B. [Ref. 12 :p.
225]
In order to fullfil the above requirement, the rational
consumer must allocate his resources such that the,
Marginal Utility of Good A Marginal Utility of Good B
Price of Good A Price of Good B
This relationship can be expressed mathematically as;
[Ref. 4:p. 55]
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MUl MU2 MU3 MUi
[1]
PI P2 P3 Pi
where MUl equals the marginal utility derived from resource
1, and PI equals the price of resource 1. In order to
maximize utility, the consumer must allocate his budget such
that the last dollar spent on all resources yields the same
proportional marginal utility.
It is this relationship between the marginal utility and
prices of resources, as described above, that is defined as
an expression of the value of resources. The greatest, or
optimal value, will be represented by the most efficient use
of resources. Efficiency in this case is represented by
consumer allocation of resources, such that the marginal
utility derived from the last cent spent on resource A, is
equal to the marginal utility derived from the last cent
spent on resource B. A lesser value is associated with less
efficient use of resources, by the consumer. The optimal
value that can be derived from resources is under conditions
wherein the relationship of equation [1] holds true. Lesser
values are derived from resources when the relationship
between resources and prices in equation [1] does not hold
true.
The relationship in equation [1] can also be expressed
graphically. The rate at which a consumer is willing to
substitute one resource for another, and still maintain a
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constant level of satisfaction, can be represented by an
indifference curve. Anywhere on this indifference curve,
the combination, or substitution of marginal amounts of one
resource for another, will yield the same amount of
satisfaction to the consumer. The indifference curve thus
measures the marginal rate of substitution of resources.
Figure 4 shows the indifference curve. [Ref. 4:p. 63]
If a line is drawn joining all the points that represent
the combinations of goods X and Y that the consumer can
afford, given his limited budget, we will have the
consumer's budget line. The budget line describes a linear




The Marginal Rate of Substitution of
Good X for Good Y
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and Y, such that constant amounts of goods can be exchanged
for one another.
Taking the consumer's budget line and lowering
successive indifference curves until such time that the
budget line intersects the indifference curve in only one
point, we will have maximized the consumer's utility. The
indifference curve that touches the budget line at only one
point will represent the highest level of satisfaction the
consumer can reach. At any indifference curve above this
point the indifference curve and the budget line will not
intersect, thus representing a combination of resources
beyond the consumer's budget. At any indifference curve
below this point, the indifference curve and the budget line
will intersect at more than one point, representing a less
than optimal utilization of resources and a lower level of
satisfaction. Figure 5 shows this relationship.
Point C in Figure 5 is that point at which the marginal
rate of substitution of good Y for good X is equal to the
rate at which the consumer can afford to substitute good X
for good Y. At this point of intersection, the slope of the






yFigure 5. The Consumer's Optimal Use of Resources






Equation [3] again describes that condition of greatest
value to the consumer.
With this introduction to how an individual can derive
the greatest utility and value from the use of resources,
let us now turn our attention to how the firm acts to derive
value from its use of resources. As compared to the
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consumer, a firm can measure the incremental increases in
utility as additional amounts of resources are used.
Instead of referring to the marginal utility, however, as a
measurement of value, we will use the marginal product of a
resource.
The marginal product of a resource is the addition to
total output due to the addition of the last unit of the
input, when the amounts of the other inputs are held
constant. [Ref. 4: p. 157] In order to maximize the value
of a firm's resources, the firm must derive the same
proportion of marginal productivity for each dollar spent on
that resource. Thus our condition for optimal value can be
stated as.
Marginal Productivity of Marginal Productivity of
Good A Good B
Price of Good A Price of Good B




where MPa equals the marginal product of an additional unit
of good A and Pa equals the price of good A.
This relationship between a firm's resources can also be
expressed graphically. The rate at which a firm can
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substitute marginal amounts of one resource for another, and
maintain a constant output, is called the marginal rate of
technical substitution [Ref. 4:p. 168]. It can be
represented by an isoquant. The rate at which the firm can
afford to substitute one resource for another within revenue
constraints can be represented by an isocost line. [Ref.
4:p. 186] Figure 6 shows an isoquant, A, and an isocost
line, B.
OcplM
Point C represents the point at which the slope of the
isoquant is equal to the slope of the isocost curve. As
this point is also on the highest possible isoquant, it
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represents the point at which the firm will derive the
greatest value from the two resources, labor and capital.
B. COST AND PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
A basic assumption of economic analysis is that the firm
acts to maximize its profits. [Ref.l3:p.l] This concept is
appealing both analytically and intuitively. Analytically,
this can be expressed as the actions required to maximize
revenue and minimize costs. Equation [5] shows this
relationship. [Ref. 13:p. 1]
Profit = Max. R(A1, . . .An) -C(A1, . . .An) [5]
Where R = Revenue realized from A actions, and
C = Costs incurred during A actions.
The firm maximizes its profits by producing outputs from
various combinations of inputs. The means by which the firm
produces can be described as the firm's technology. In
examining the firm's technology, two approaches can be
taken. One approach is to look at a firm's output in terms
of it's technological possibilities. The output is examined
in terms of how inputs are utilized. This approach uses
production functions to describe this relationship between
output and factors of production, or input resources.
The production function describes a particular output
based upon possible combinations of resources and the
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ability of management to efficiently utilize these
resources. Output is therefore determined in part by the
availability of resources, and also by the management
expertise employed in the production process.
Production functions can be described in terms of
constant, decreasing, or increasing returns to scale. With
constant returns to scale, a 1% increase in an input gives
rise to a similar increase in output. With decreasing
returns to scale, output increases by less than the
percentage increase in the amount of the resource.
Increasing returns to scale result in greater increases in
output for a given increase in input resources.
Thus, while it may be possible to specify the quantities
of resources to be used during production, the management
skills applied in combining these resources may range from
poor and ineffective, to outstanding and quite effective.
The resultant output possibilities can similarly range from
poor to outstanding depending upon the management skills
applied. The production function therefore refers to the
technological possibilities of the firm.
As opposed to looking at the firm's production function,
the second approach to understanding how the firm acts to
maximize profit is to look at the firm's cost function.
This approach concentrates on the firm's behavior rather
than its possibilities. The cost function describes the
relationship between inputs, input prices, and outputs.
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According to the Duality Theory of Production, the cost
function describes all economically relevant information
about the technology of the firm.
If C is total cost, then C = F + V(Q) , where F is the
total fixed costs and V(Q) is the total variable costs,
expressed as a function of the total quantity produced, Q.
Total cost is therefore dependent upon Q and input prices.
As fixed costs are constant in the short run, they will not
in the short run affect changes in total cost. Input
quantities are determined by the level of output, and are
thus determined by Q. The only variables that can determine
total cost are therefore input prices and Q, the output
quantity. [Ref. 13:p. 35]
By varying the total cost function with respect to the
input prices, the technology required to produce various
levels of output can be determined. In this fashion, the
technology required for a particular cost function can also
be determined. [Ref. 13 :p. 35]
With use of the Duality Theory of Production, the
technology for a given firm can be constructed from its cost
function. However, from the buyer's perspective, although
we are interested in the seller's technology, in the
interests of cost, we are much more interested in how
efficiently he uses his technology. The more efficient firm
will represent a greater value, as we would expect his costs
to be less over time. For this reason, it is more
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advantageous for us to further examine the firm's production
function.
In theory, a firm's production function describes the
most efficient output that can be obtained with an existing
state of technology from given quantities of inputs. Only
the most efficient production techniques are described by
the production function.
The most popular model used in formulating production
functions is the Cobb-Douglas production function. The
Cobb-Douglas model is of the form,
Q = AL^K^M<^ [6]
where Q is the quantity produced, L is the amount of labor,
K is the amount of capital, and M is the amount of raw
materials, and A, a, b, and c are parameters to be
estimated. [Ref. 4:p. 174]
Admittedly, there are many problems involved in the
measurement of production functions. The data collected may
not always represent technically efficient combinations of
input resources. Another problem is how to measure the
diverse nature of capital. Capital is composed of a variety
of plant, equipment and facilities. Expressing these in a
single point estimate poses unique problems. Theoretically,
the use of production functions permits us to make many
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assumptions, that may in fact prove difficult to make in
actually estimating a production function.
If we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the
above form, we may derive the marginal product of each
factor of production. As the marginal product is equal to
the change in output for a given change in input, we simply
take partial derivatives of output with respect to each









Once we have derived the marginal product of each
resource, we could then theoretically determine the most
efficient mix of resources. As we have seen this occurs
when the marginal product of the last dollar spent on one
resource is equal to the marginal product of the last dollar
spent on the next resource. In the Cobb-Douglas production





Given the production function and the prices of the
resources, we could solve for the most efficient mixes of
resources.
C. A MARGINAL APPROACH TO COST ANALYSIS
Let us now see how we could use marginal analysis theory
to evaluate contract proposal costs. First we shall assume
that the production functions of the firms that have
submitted proposals have previously been estimated, and they
are of the Cobb-Douglas form. As we discussed, there are
formidable problems involved in estimating a firm's
production function. Nonetheless, we shall proceed for the
sake of argument. For purposes of simplicity, we shall also
assume that the procurement under consideration requires
only one type of direct labor, and two types of direct
materials. The production functions of the firms,
describing their output in terms of labor, capital, and raw
materials, are as follows.
Firm A
Q = L-2k-4m-3 [11]
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Firm B
Q = l-25k-30m.35 |-12]
Both firm's proposals are for a production quantity of
562 units. In order to estimate the values for direct
labor and raw materials in equations [11] and [12], the
proposals of the firms must first be examined. Both firms'
proposals are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3
FIRM A AND B PROPOSALS
FIRM A FIRM B
Purchased Parts (M) $20,000 $10,000
Raw Material (M) 50,000 60,000
Subtotal 70,000 70,000
Material overhead 7,000 (10%) 3,500 (5%)
Labor (L) 40,000 30,000
Labor Overhead 48,000 (120%) 37,500 (125%)
Subtotal 165,000 141,000
G&A 33,000 (20%) 21,150 (15%)
Subtotal 198,000 162,150
Profit 19,800 (10%) 16,215 (10%)
Total 217,800 178,365
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Because this procurement is a competitive proposal, and
it is over $100,000, cost and pricing data will have been
submitted. From the cost or pricing data, we can determine
the actual prices and quantities of direct material and





















Futhermore, our research has shown that this contract
will utilize 1% of firm A's plantwide assets of $20M, or
$200,000. For firm B, this contract will utilize .57% of
his plantwide assets of $50M, or $285,000.
With the information provided in the offerors' proposals
and cost and pricing data, the marginal products of direct
labor and raw materials, for both firms can be derived. The
marginal product of capital can be derived from our previous
research, as capital is not presented in the proposals or
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cost and pricing data in a form that can be used for this
application.
The marginal products of firm A for direct labor, direct
material, and capital are,










The marginal products of firm B for direct labor, direct














For each firm, the most efficient use of resources will
occur when the ratio of the marginal products to the price





For firm B, this equals,
.25LL~-'75k-30m-35 ^ 35L. 25^. 30j^-. 65 . 30L- ^Sr"- 70j^. 35
PI Pm Pk
[20]
Given that we know the prices of the firm's resources,
we could solve the above equations for the most efficient
combination of resources required. However, both
contractors have proposed the combination of resources they
intend to use on this contract. This poses the question,
"Which proposal is the most efficient.?"
With the information we have at hand we can determine
which firm is using their direct resources most efficiently.
If both firms were using their resources at optimal
efficiency, the variance of the ratios in equations [19] and
[20] would be zero. The variance must be zero because the
proportion of marginal productivity to resource price for
each resource must be the same. Therefore the firm with
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lowest variance will also be the most efficient user of
direct resources.
In order to compute the variances, we must substitute in
equations [19] and [20], for direct labor and direct
material, the quantities of labor, purchased parts, raw
materials, capital utilized, and the prices for labor and
material. For firm A, we have.
.2 (1000) "-3(200, 000) -4(7,000) -^
40
.3 (1000) -2(200,000) • ^ (5 , 000) " - "^
10







Now solving for the variance of these two numbers, using
the formula, s2 = )^(X-x) 2/n-l, where s2 is the variance.
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(X-X)^ is the deviation of any value of X from the
arithmetic mean, x, (X-X) ^ is the sum of the squared
deviations, and n is the number of items in the sample
From this calculation, s^ = .0004855.
If we now do the same calculation for firm B,
substituting in equation [20], we have,
.25 (1,000) "•'75(2 85, 000) -^0(8,000) '^^
30
.35(1,000) -25(285,000) • ^0 ( g
^
qOO) " • ^5
10







Solving for the variance in the same manner as above,
s2 =. .002444.
Because the variance of firm A is less than the variance
of firm B, we may conclude that firm A's utilization of
direct resources is more efficient than that of firm B.
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This information could then be used in subsequent source
selection decisions.
If the source selection warranted concern about a
possible "buy in", and all evaluation criteria were in fact
evaluated fairly closely, with the exception of cost, then
the relative efficiency of the offerors would be critical to
source selection. By making the source selection decision
now on the basis of efficiency and cost, rather than cost
alone, the possibility of the "buy in" strategy succeeding
may be averted.
If a "buy in" was a true concern, then efficiency of the
offerors would be weighted as an evaluation criterion more
heavily than cost. In this case, firm A, rather than firm B
would then be the apparent winner. The result of this
decision would be twofold. First, the expected change
proposals, which would lead to contract cost growth, of the
firm attempting the "buy in" would be averted. Secondly, if
changes were in fact warranted to the contract, the firm
proposing the changes would be the more efficient in terms
of usage of direct labor and raw materials. The resultant
changes would therefore be expected to cost less.
D. SUMMARY
The marginal analysis illustrated above shows how
contract proposals could be evaluated for relative
efficiency. For simplicity, only three different direct
resources were utilized. In fact, however, a typical
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contract proposal will normally comprise many different
types and prices of labor, and hundreds, or even thousands
of different materials and prices. An analysis of this
nature would mandate the use of a computerized application.
In addition, this analysis only concentrates on the
efficiency with which direct resources are utilized. It
does not address the issue of the efficiency with which
indirect materials and labor are utilized. In fact, in our
example, firm A utilized direct materials more efficiently
than firm B, but their bottom line price was higher than
firm B. This was due to their higher overhead costs.
This analysis should be used in conjunction with
traditional methods of cost analysis, and include the DCAA
audit report (which examines overhead allocations) , and the
field pricing report. If used as an additional tool of cost
analysis, marginal analysis could then aid the contracting
officer during negotiations, and ultimately strengthen the
source selection process.
Like other cost analysis techniques, marginal analysis
should not necessarily be used on all procurements. But, in
those procurements where there has been a history of "buy
ins" (e.g., commercial overhaul of U.S. Naval ships),
marginal analysis may aid in detecting a "buy in."
In this respect, the marginal analysis could be used
during negotiations to confront the offeror's position as
not reflecting reasonable economy and efficiency. Although
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his offer may appear attractive on the basis of price alone,
he may find himself excluded from contract award because the
Government fears a "buy in." This in itself may be enough
to force the offeror attempting the "buy in" to revise his
strategy. Hopefully, it would. If it did not, then the
results of the marginal analysis could be used as a source
selection criterion.
If marginal analysis was to ultimately be used as a
source selection criterion, notice of such use must be made
in the Request For Proposals (RFP) , as well as the relative
weight to be accorded to it. This decision will again be
based upon the Government's past experience with the
respective type of procurement. Its use could be very
similar to that of cost realism, whereby sufficient notice
is awarded potential offerors that source selection may not
be made on the basis of price alone.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapter has demonstrated the theoretical
application of marginal analysis to the contract evaluation
process. The contracting officer could, if he was permitted
to do so by the FAR, use this methodology in his
determination of a fair and reasonable price. What remains
however, is a determination of the conditions under which
this type of analysis could be used.
To begin with, it is important to realize that the
significance of cost analysis (or price analysis) is that it
is used to develop a prenegotiating position. This fact is
shrouded in the regulatory language of seeking to determine
a fair and reasonable price. The goal of procurement is to
secure goods and services at a fair and reasonable price,
but this objective is achieved only through negotiations.
Negotiations require a carefully developed plan from which
the Government can seek agreement with contractors on a
contract. The prenegotiating position is the focal point of
this plan. It represents the price the Government actually
hopes to reach agreement on. It is also what the Government
believes to be a fair and reasonable price to both parties.
Cost analysis is a means by which the prenegotiating
position is determined.
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From this point there are two potential difficulties
that can arise. First with our present methods of cost
analysis, we may actually be encouraging the contractor to
inflate his costs. Both the contractor and the Government
anticipate a process in which the assumptions and methods
supporting the contractor's estimates will be questioned,
ultimately resulting in a Government estimate of the cost to
produce below that of the contractor's original proposal.
Expecting this to occur, the contractor may very well
inflate his costs to compensate for the incremental
decreases that cost analysis will necessitate.
Methods have been developed to deal with this problem,
such as should cost analysis, but their investment costs are
high and the possibility of realizing any net benefits must
be carefully examined.
The second difficulty encountered is that once
negotiations have been completed with all offerors in the
competitive range, the source selection process may be
forced to use price as the discriminating criterion. This
will occur if all offers are evaluated fairly closely on all
other criteria. By default then, price will determine
contract award. The difficulty with this result is that
price alone may not be the best indicator of the best value
to the Government. One of our assumptions in entering into
negotiations was that they were necessary to determine a
fair and reasonable price because competition was not
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effective. We thus entered negotiations because we could
not determine contract award on the basis of price alone.
We now find ourselves subsequently making contract award on
the basis of that which we wanted to avoid, price. There is
a glaring contradiction here.
Methods have also been developed to deal with this
difficulty, such as cost realism. But there are
difficulties inherent in the use of cost realism scoring
systems.
These two difficulties in the contract evaluation and
source selection process become acute if the contractor is
attempting a buy in. A buy in, by definition, is an attempt
by an offeror to win a contract by offering a price below
that of all his competitors and below his own breakeven
point. He then attempts to make a profit on the contract by
subsequently negotiating changes to the contract after
contract award. The term "getting well through changes"
summarizes the buy in philosophy.
DOD is very sensitive to buy ins because they ultimately
result in cost overruns and delay in scheduled contract
completion. Both of these are the makings of political
campaigns against the DOD budget.
During a buy in, these two difficulties can combine to
severely injure DOD. If, in fact, a contractor is
attempting a buy in, then he may very well win the contract
if price alone becomes the sole discriminating criterion.
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This alone has potentially serious consequences, which will
become apparent to DOD as engineering change proposals start
to accumulate. However, the injury that has been inflicted
will be compounded because DOD may very well not realize
that the buy in strategy has been successful.
DOD assumes that during contract evaluation, cost
analysis was used to develop a prenegotiating position.
Negotiations were then held with all qualified offerors to
reach agreement on a price that was fair and reasonable to
both parties. It would therefore appear reasonable to
assume that the contract winner should be proceeding in good
faith in contract performance. The truth of the matter may
in fact be, that cost analysis was inadequate in uncovering
the contractor's padding of costs. What DOD assumed to be a
fair and reasonable price, was actually the buy in strategy.
The buy in may therefore work, and DOD may not realize it
until it is too late, because cost analysis results were
relied upon.
This thesis has proposed that in the absence of
effective competition, marginal analysis is a method that
could be used during cost analysis. Marginal analysis seeks
to determine which contractor is using direct labor and
materials most efficiently. Rather than reacting to the
gaming strategy of the contractor's assumptions and
estimating system, marginal analysis determines the best
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value on the basis of the contractor's utilization of
resource quantities and prices.
The methods of contract evaluation and source selection
prescribed by the FAR may work fairly well, most of the
time. But when a buy in is being attempted, these methods
are susceptible to failure. If marginal analysis is
utilized when a buy in is suspected, in conjunction with
prescribed cost analysis methods, a prenegotiating position
will still be developed. However, an additional piece of
information will be available. The most efficient operating
producer will be known, who will in fact represent the
greatest value to DOD if all offers are evaluated fairly
closely on all source selection criteria. Rather than
source selection then being made on the basis of the lowest
price, it will be made on the basis of the most efficient
offeror.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Efficiency of offerors should be used as a source
selection criterion when there is historical evidence
indicating that a buy in is probable. Because there is a
chance that the Government may be forced to make source
selection ultimately on the basis of price alone, an
additional source selection criterion is required to ensure
that the Government will receive the greatest value. By
making source selection solely on the basis of price, the
Government may be agreeing to a contractual arrangement
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that may ultimately escalate in cost and price, if a buy in
has been successful.
Marginal analysis should be used to determine the
efficiency of offerors, by comparing their relative ratios
of marginal product to the respective prices for
resources used. An offeror whose efficiency is evaluated
higher that a competitor can then be assumed to offer a
greater value, as his costs would grow comparatively less
over time.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Further research is needed in the area of developing
production functions for individual firms.
2. The application of marginal analysis to contract
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